Adil Najam
Rumors of a ‘deal’ between PPP leader Benazir Bhutto and Gen. Pervez Musharraf have been rife for a long time. All indications now suggest that a deal of some sort has, in fact, been reached.
The ferocity with which the rumors are being denied – with obvious insincerity – suggests that something is afoot. The question is, exactly what.
There is little utility, it seems to us, to indulge any further in the speculation than people already are. The much more important question is what – if anything – will such a deal mean for Pakistan and for democracy in Pakistan.
Will it make things better? Will it make things worse? Will things remain as they have always been and this will simply be one more round in the ‘great game’ of musical chairs that has always been Pakistan politics?
That is the question for our new ATP Poll (see top of middle column). Let us know what you think, and why? With your vote in the poll and with your comments below.
Seems from this article (Hussain Haqqani’s) that HH will definately get some good position if Benazir ever comes back to power. Most of the points that this guy has raised favour BB’s support. I don’t know if people still remember that HH used to speak same good language for Nawaz Sharif at one point, infact, the highest ranking position that he has ever been to has been under Nawaz’s rule. I don’t think HH’s article is unbiased from any angle and as another gentleman mentioned in the previous post that he is a lota, I fully agree.
I didn’t know how else to reach you Mr. Adil so I’m leaving this here:
Do you know where this is in Pakistan?:
http://dictatorlipstick.wordpress.com/
If a corrupt person like benazir comes this time, it’ll make the situation worse. Who knows the title of zardari may jump upto Mr 100% from being Mr 10%. Also this will prove that musharaf is and was never sincere to Pakistan. I can think of any other person to be a future leader except this benazir and her most corrupt husband will be the worst nightmare. Nawaz Sharif may be lallu, panju or whatever but to me he is more muhib-e-watan than her. In her 2 previous tenures, she did not do a single good thing for Pakistan. Oh yes thats the reason why there is so much pressure on mushy to bring her back, but on the other hand mushy is too coward and hopeless himself too.
There won’t be a deal. Return of BB will be end of Mush. I see recent events in the light of this hypothesis, as discussed here.
This perspective from Hussain Haqqani on what may or may not be happening here is an important and relevant one. I am sorry to have missed it earlier but am attaching it here.
Published in The Nation and other outlets.
– – – – – – – – – –Illusion of a Deal
By Husain Haqqani
Each time General Pervez Musharraf comes under pressure at home or abroad, his minions float rumours of an impending deal with opposition leader Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Musharraf’s emissaries fly to Dubai, meet Ms. Bhutto and then both sides deny that a deal is in the making. Ms Bhutto’s willingness to keep open channels of communication with all political forces in Pakistan is abused by the Musharraf regime to create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one.
Over the last few weeks, General Musharraf emerged as an increasingly ineffective military ruler facing widespread resentment at home and growing international ridicule. There is only one thing worse than a military strong running a country and that is a strongman who is clearly weak. Even Musharraf’s American armour has started to show some chinks. The U.S. media is openly questioning his ability to govern and his willingness to curb Taliban extremism. Several significant American senators wrote a letter recently to Musharraf urging him to allow the exiled national leaders, Ms Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League-N chief, Nawaz Sharif, to return and participate in the general elections.
Even the State department spokesman, who said only a few days ago that Musharraf was “acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people” went on to suggest that the Pakistani government “instill a sense of confidence among the people that it will adhere to the rule of law as it deals with protestors demonstrating against the ouster of the Supreme Court [chief] justice.” Implicit was the recognition that such confidence did not exist, which is why the Pakistan foreign office felt compelled to respond that foreign comments on the issue were “not welcome.”
As if to defuse the pressure, the rumour of a deal with Ms Bhutto was spread. To make the rumours plausible, the government abolished the cell that was supposedly investigating the foreign assets and offshore bank accounts of some politicians, including Ms Bhutto. A senior civil servant, identified most closely with the prosecution of cases against Ms Bhutto and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, was transferred and the impression was given that this was part of “confidence-building measures” preceding a Musharraf-Bhutto deal. But the substantive issues such as guarantees for a free and fair election and the restoration of civilian rule were not addressed as they have remained unaddressed before.
A deal between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf would suit the United States and is supported by the liberal segment of Pakistan’s oligarchy. Ms Bhutto would bring popular support for a power-sharing arrangement and could provide Pakistan’s army with an exit strategy. Through a deal, Musharraf could phase himself out of power in a predictable and planned manner, avoiding uncertainties that have followed past military rulers in Pakistan’s history. What, then, prevents a deal?
General Musharraf represents a certain mindset, prevalent in the higher echelons of the Pakistani military, which makes him believe in his own invincibility. Whether it is the handling of India and Afghanistan or relations with the political opposition, Musharraf negotiates not for a deal but to buy time. Once the immediate crisis is over, he feels no need for a deal and negotiation process falls by the wayside until the next major crisis. Furthermore, Musharraf is willing to give immediate payoffs but is unwilling to bargain over the near-divine right of army chiefs to rule.
In case of negotiations with Ms Bhutto, the two sides are far apart on fundamentals. Musharraf considers changes in his (and Pakistani intelligence machinery’s) relentless pursuit of Ms Bhutto and her family as major concessions for which Ms Bhutto should be grateful. From Ms Bhutto’s point of view, the cases against her constitute persecution and an end to persecution is the precondition for talks, not the desirable outcome. She wants negotiations to focus on political and constitutional matters, such as Musharraf’s uniform and guarantees for a free and fair poll.
The cases against Ms Bhutto and her husband have lost their significance and, though still an inconvenience, do not have the same leverage they might have had a few years earlier. Fewer people around the world believe in the validity of the charges, which have largely remained unproven after almost eleven years. By way of comparison, let us examine other instances of former heads of government accused of corruption.
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos was removed from office in 1986. The graft cases against him and his wife, Imelda, were wrapped up by 1993 – a total duration of seven years. The cases against the Marcoses involved “billions of dollars” in cash and assets in several countries and still took no more than seven years to conclude. In case of Ms Bhutto and Mr. Zardari, eleven years have passed since Ms Bhutto’s removal from power in 1996 and not a single case has been finalized.
Just as Musharraf and his military-intelligence machine use the rumours of a deal for advantage, the corruption cases too are proving to be illusory. The strategy has been to keep the sword of Damocles of allegations hanging without actually securing any convictions or final judgments. But the political value of the cases has diminished precisely because they haven’t been proven. Musharraf’s ability to blackmail Ms Bhutto on the strength of these cases is fading.
Why, under such circumstances, does Ms Bhutto not agree to a grand alliance between Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, including the Islamist Mutahhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and use violent protests to oust Musharraf? Ms Bhutto has clearly been weighing the pros and cons of joining an agitation which runs the risk of being hijacked by the Islamists and their structured organization.
Ms. Bhutto has to take into consideration the network of Islamists within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. After all, liberal politicians (notably Air Marshal Asghar Khan) contributed strongly to the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) campaign of 1977 only to find General Ziaul Haq ready to take over and rule for eleven years with the help of the Islamists within the PNA.
Pakistan’s drawing classes, who have never been kind to Ms Bhutto except for a short stint in 1988, continue to criticize her but her core support base among the masses has remained more or less intact. The PPP’s vote bank even in 2002 stood at 28 percent, with all the restrictions and difficulties of exile.
Pakistan’s intelligentsia recounts Benazir Bhutto’s supposed flaws and weaknesses almost on a daily basis but they forget her baptism by fire, which is her greatest strength. She has lost her father and two brothers to the Pakistani establishment, has borne the brunt of demonization and her husband has spent over 8 years in prison under trial (without conviction). Politics has affected her life far more than that of the drawing room class that hates her in its angry moments and criticizes her in the good ones.
Ms Bhutto is ready to return to Pakistan and to lead the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in a free and fair election. She is currently struggling to mobilize international support from exile for a free poll in addition to supporting the combined opposition’s mobilization of public opinion within the country. But Ms Bhutto is also clear that she wants to pave the way for the army’s withdrawal to the barracks and the emergence of a functioning democracy. She will not take hasty steps that might perpetuate Khaki shadows over Pakistan.