Adil Najam
This post continues our series on the events of 1971. The previous three parts of the series can be read here, here, here and here.
It has always surprised me that in all our discussions of the traumas of 1971 the name of Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan much less frequently than it perhaps should given his role. He presided over the beginnings of a military campaign against what were (then) his own people, what escalated into a full-fledged civil war, eventually an international war, and finally the breakup of the country.
Indeed the complexities were great, there were many other individuals involved, and the roots of all that happened went much further and deeper than just the events of 1971. Yet, Gen. Yahya Khan was in command – of military as well as civilian operations – in those moments of ignominy. But still, for some reason his mentions tend to be fleeting. Although never flattering, there is a sense that we want to move away from the topic of Gen. Yahya Khan as soon as we can; possibly to get to that perennial favorite topic: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
In watching this video (from July 31, 1971) this thought struck me again. I realized that at least I had never before seen a recording of him speaking at length. This particularly interview was particularly disturbing also for its content. The arrogance that he was known for and the sense that he as indeed out of touch with what was happening in the country are all too evidently on display:
“If a Head of State is out of touch with any part of his country, I don’t think he has any damn right to remain Head of the State… the moment I find I am out of touch – out of touch with my people – I shall quit… I know East Pakistan more than East Pakistanis know themselves… I am not out of touch. I know exactly hat is happening.”
Equally disturbing is the bit where towards the end he rants about Ireland. This is more disturbing because this is a commentary not only on 1971 but on today. It is all too often that when confronted with evidence of problems within our own polity and society our gut instinct is to (a) highlight how “we are not alone in doing whatever is being condemned” and (b) to argue that since others do it too, therefore it must not really be that bad!
Such discourse has always disturbed me because on the one hand it holds ourselves to the lowest possible standards and on the other hand it it comes across as a sign of being in denial. I hope readers will hear this part of the video (at the end) with care and think hard about how we ourselves sound exactly the same when we make similar arguments about denial!
Excellent post. Not just the video but the words and writeup of the post make us think. I hope we will THINK! It is not something we do often.
Thank you ATP for being all of our conscience.
Takhalus makes a good point that “the majority of the general ‘West Pakistani’ populace felt relieved when the Army took action ……people like Asghar khan … condemned the action but were largely ignored by the people.” This seems to be repeating again in Pakistan… though when we kill Pakistanis this time around, the world is with us.
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/archive/021215/bo oks1.htm
December 15, 2002
EXCERPTS: Did Bhutto break up Pakistan?
By Khalid Hasan
…
Shafi told me this story in 1972 when we were both working for Bhutto, he as his naval ADC and I as his first press secretary. Two days after the crackdown began, Bhutto, who was in Dhaka, was taken to the rooftop of the Intercontinental Hotel on the night of the crackdown to get him a bird’s eye view of the city of Dhaka with fires burning in many areas and the sound of gunfire echoing in the night air. Two days later, he took a flight to Karachi. On arrival at the airport, there was only one reporter to receive him, I.A. Khan of the Associated Press of Pakistan to whom he said,
“Thank God, Pakistan has been saved.”
He was never able to explain or justify this statement as long as he lived. In fact, when the case proving Bhutto’s complicity in the military crackdown on East Pakistan is argued, this single-line statement is cited as the smoking gun. The blood bath in East Pakistan continued through the summer of 1971, but not once did Bhutto make any reference to it in his speeches or statements. On the contrary, his contact with Yahya and men like Gen Pirzada, Yahya’s chief-of-staff, whom many considered the real evil presence in the General’s secretariat, increased.
…
Excellent post. I hope we can some how rise above the ills which Adil Najam so rightly pointed out ….”on the one hand it holds ourselves to the lowest possible standards and on the other hand it it comes across as a sign of being in denial”
The thing I found is that Army is the most unreliable source of information. If we would be living in that era when this speech was made I guess, nobody would have believed that East Pakistan would be separated. They are firm, arrogant and confident on what they are saying. I observed this phenomenon real time during 2nd Iraq War when Iraqi army general used to come to media daily and used to say firmly and confidently that Iraq is winning the war. After one such evening, the next day he was arrested. Revelation of this phenomenon coupled with current situation in Pakistan is leading to an unacceptable mathematics.